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Alternative Methods of Service Delivery in Small and Rural Municipalities 
 
Abstract:  Choices in production and contracting arrangements for a wide range of services were 
studied using data from approximately 1,000 small, mostly rural municipalities from Illinois, 
New Hampshire and Wisconsin.  Results suggest the use of both for-profit contractors and 
cooperative agreements with other governments correlate negatively with population.  Small 
municipalities are less likely to use competitive bidding processes, compare costs between 
production options, or report that privatization produces savings.  Median income, rural 
geography, and ideology show statistically-significant associations with contracting choices.  
Respondents generally consider themselves ―satisfied‖ with services provided by contract, 
although satisfaction levels are lower than those associated with self-provision.  Satisfaction 
associated with services provided by other governments is lower than satisfaction with services 
provided by private contractors, suggesting no tradeoff in service quality directly attributable to 
―for-profit‖ contractors. 2 
 
Introduction 
  Many small and rural local governments face the stresses of economic downturns or 
stagnation and are struggling to maintain service levels.  Other municipalities, amenity rich or 
within commuting distance to urban areas, cope with population growth and additional service 
demands.  Local governments also face long-term declines in state and federal support and 
resistance towards expanding traditional revenue sources like property taxes or exploring new 
revenue sources like user fees and charges.  These governments feel pressure to find more 
efficient ways to produce necessary services.  One option receiving significant attention in urban 
settings is privatization, where a municipality uses competitive bidding to contract out 
production of services to for-profit firms.  While this option has enjoyed success in larger and 
medium sized cities, it poses potential problems for smaller, rural communities.  Producing 
public services by engaging for-profit firms requires clearly delineated, enforceable contracts, 
sufficient numbers of qualified contractors to allow competitive bidding, and managerial 
capacity to supervise contractor performance, which the smallest municipalities may lack. 
If privatization through contracting with a for-profit firm is not feasible for the 
production of a particular service in a small municipality, a cooperative agreement to work 
jointly with a neighboring government to produce services might be an alternative.
1  Lackey et 
al. (2002, 138) argue that such agreements offer ―increased local decision-making capacity, 
retention of local identity, increased access to external resources, economies of scale, cost-
effectiveness, protection for resource-dependent economies, and greater political influence 
through strength in numbers.‖  Nonetheless, much of the literature perceives inter-governmental 
cooperation as a relatively rare event, with the exception of emergency services (Cigler 1994).     3 
 
This study considers a full range of choices that small and rural municipalities face: 
providing services themselves, entering into an agreement with a profit or not-for-profit 
contractor, or entering into an agreement with another government or authority.  Unlike most 
studies, which focus on specific services, our data cover 59 common municipal functions.  By 
studying small and rural communities, a broad range of services, and a menu of different options 
for production of those services, we hope to shed light on some issues that are currently only 
incompletely understood.  For example, the data can highlight the very different constraints 
faced by small and rural communities compared to their larger urban or suburban counterparts, 
and provide detailed insight into how factors like fiscal stress, prior experiences, and future 
expectations might shape production decisions.  Analysis of the data can highlight how the 
choices of privatization and inter-governmental cooperation relate and provide insight into the 
relative outcomes of privatization and cooperative agreements.  This study is among the first to 
examine the levels of satisfaction associated with different forms of service provision. 
Background 
  Focusing on small municipalities is particularly interesting when considered from 
different theoretical perspectives relating to privatization.  Bel and Fageda (2008), for example, 
classify most of the theoretical work as taking either a public choice, or transactions costs 
approach.  The public choice approach can often be characterized by a ―leviathan‖ view of 
government, which argues that government monopoly over public services leads to over 
production and inefficiency.
2  This view suggests that outsourcing the production of public 
services may not only be a sound management decision, but also a sound economic growth 
decision.  The belief that governments tend towards inefficiency has helped bolster the New 
Public Management philosophy and management approach (Terry 2005; Hood 1995; Kettl 4 
 
1997).  The logic behind New Public Management is that government officials and managers 
need to be more entrepreneurial in their approach to service production.  While the provisionary 
decisions of which services to provide and how to pay for them remain within the political realm 
of elected officials, production decisions are more technical and more in line with the 
functioning of private businesses.  As such, public administration can benefit from studying 
business concepts of customer service, total quality management and outsourcing (Lyons and 
Lowery 1989).  One of the ramifications of this approach has been a rapid increase in exploring 
alternative service delivery options such as contracts with for-profit firms or non-profits and 
forming cooperative agreements with neighboring local governments for joint service delivery. 
  The adoption of New Public Management approaches has led to concerns that center on 
what Terry (2005) describes as the ―hollowing of the state.‖  As governments increasingly rely 
on contracts with private providers, traditional public institutions are radically restructured.  In 
the extreme, rather than managing personnel or organizing departments, public administrators 
are reduced to monitoring contracts.  The concern is that, as public institutions are restructured 
around an expertise in managing private contractors, the ability to return to traditional 
arrangements will be difficult, even if the new contracts prove to be disadvantageous. 
  The transactions costs approach (e.g. Williamson 1979 and 1999) maintains that factors 
that affect transactions costs, like the ability to monitor and enforce contracts, determine the 
relative benefits of different forms of service provision.  Much of the current work in New Public 
Management focuses on methods of developing, monitoring and enforcing contracts (Brown and 
Potoski 2003; Rornzek and Johnston 2005).  Skeptics of public-private collaboration note that 
poor contract structure is a problem (Bloomfield 2006).  Especially in smaller and more rural 
municipalities, much of the decision to ―outsource‖ service production may hinge on the ability 5 
 
to write and monitor enforceable contracts.  In a series of studies looking at managerial capacity 
of smaller and rural governments, Honadle (e.g. 1981, 2001) finds that many of these 
governments are run by volunteers and a small staff of employees.  The municipal clerk may 
have an associate’s degree in accounting and the public works director spends the majority of her 
time plowing roads and filling potholes.  Given the lack of professional or trained staff, smaller 
municipalities may be at a relative disadvantage in writing and monitoring enforceable contracts. 
Other studies reinforce the conclusion that small communities face higher and different 
forms of transaction costs.  Deller (1998) shows that the ability for smaller and rural local 
governments to enact and supervise contracts, which requires tasks like auditing, maintaining 
quality standards, and responding to cost overruns, is particularly limited.  Brown and Potoski 
(2003, 154) argue that contract management is ―a highly complex process requiring multiple 
types of expertise from public managers.‖  The small municipalities studied here (over half with 
a population of under 5,000) might be unable to provide such a level of expertise.  Terry (2005) 
and Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke (2006) show that even large units of government have 
difficulty negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts.  It is likely that these challenges are 
magnified in smaller and rural local governments, so that these communities lack capacity to 
fully benefit from outsourcing provision responsibilities to private providers.  Since lack of 
managerial capacity may make it difficult for the smallest municipalities to benefit fully from 
privatization, our work also considers the degree that such municipalities provide services 
through cooperative agreements between governments such as formal and informal agreements 
to lend each other support for emergency services.
3 
Few studies look closely at the experiences of small municipalities using cross-sectional 
data.  Research typically draws on the International City and County Management Association 6 
 
surveys (e.g. Greene 1996; Ferris and Graddy 1986; Warner and Hefetz 2002), or the Census of 
Governments (e.g., Kodrzycki 1994; Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  Such 
analyses have three central limitations.  First, they lack detail in terms of history of service 
provision methods used.  Contracts that have been in place for years are treated the same as 
newly adopted forms of provision.  Today’s characteristics might be used to explain patterns of 
decisions that were made years prior.
4  Second, many studies use a dichotomous dependent 
variable often in the form of a yes/no response.  This masks the continuous nature of many 
service-production arrangements.  Municipalities may contract for road construction but retain 
maintenance responsibilities; some state mandated social services cannot be contracted out but 
supplemental services such as domestic abuse support services are contracted to non-profits.  
Forms of contracting also differ.  Contracted services might be produced by another municipality 
or a for-profit firm.  Third, and most relevant to our work, is that surveys of municipalities 
typically exclude municipalities of less than 10,000, or provide data only at the county level.
5 
Data 
The research presented here uses survey data from approximately 1,000 municipalities in 
Illinois (IL), New Hampshire (NH), and Wisconsin (WI).  All of the included municipalities are 
small, over a third have populations less than 1,000, and a significant proportion is rural. New 
Hampshire is a small, rural, somewhat conservative state with a long tradition of decentralized, 
local control.  Illinois is dominated by a large metro area and therefore allows for insights into 
patterns of service production at the edge of the urban fringe.  Wisconsin contains a 
heterogeneous mix of small and medium sized communities.  While there are state specific 
characteristics that make each state unique, the only ―oddity‖ might be the lack of a viable 
network of county governments in New Hampshire.  In Illinois and Wisconsin the county is a 7 
 
viable potential partner for many small and rural municipalities whereas this option is not 
available for New Hampshire municipalities.  The classic example is contracting with the county 
sheriff department to provide law enforcement services to municipal residents. 
  Primary data for this study come from three separate municipal surveys in Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and New Hampshire.  The first was the 1995 Illinois Municipal Privatization 
Questionnaire, which served as a model for the subsequent studies in WI (1997) and NH (2004).  
In each state, the survey was distributed jointly by researchers at one of the state’s public 
universities and a local government association (Illinois Municipal League, Wisconsin League of 
Municipalities, and The NH Local Government Center).  The IL survey produced 516 responses, 
the WI Survey produced 452 responses and the NH survey produced 138 responses, yielding 
response rates of 40%, 73%, and 59%, respectively.  Johnson and Walzer (1996, 1998), Deller, 
Hinds, and Hinman (2001) and Girard et al. (2009) provide detailed descriptions of the survey 
design and implementation for each survey.  Survey instruments followed identical formats 
across all three states; while the disparate timing of the three surveys makes it impossible to 
differentiate between state-specific and year-specific trends in the data, the survey instruments 
were administered with the ultimate intent of assembling a multi-state data set. 
  In addition to asking about fiscal health and background materials, the surveys focus on 
asking how each of 82 services is provided and the level of satisfaction (a 5 point Likert scale) 
with the service provision arrangement.  Choices over service provision include ―municipal 
provision‖ (either ―entirely‖ or ―in part‖), ―another government or authority,‖ or ―private‖ (either 
―for-profit‖ or ―non-profit‖).  The survey also asks general questions about plans for future 
outsourcing, the government’s role in providing services to other municipalities, experiences 
with privatization in nearby municipalities, and experiences with bidding and contracts. 8 
 
  A number of the 82 services are only rarely provided by municipalities across all three 
states.  In such cases, respondents were instructed to not respond to the questions.  To avoid 
drawing inferences from very small samples, we exclude 21 services that have less than a 40 
percent response rate among completed surveys.  Because our study focuses on the tradeoffs 
faced by small and rural municipalities, we also exclude data from municipalities with 
populations exceeding 50,000.  The remaining data cover 1,083 municipalities and 59 services.  
After excluding non-responses for particular questions, this produces a data set with 36,605 
municipality-service combinations.  In addition to providing a descriptive summary of the survey 
results, we also use a multivariate analysis to identify effects of factors such as population, 
income levels, and fiscal stress on the decision to use alternative delivery options. 
Descriptive Results 
Characteristics of Municipalities.  Fiscal stress, managerial capacity, and scale may influence 
the choices made by small and rural governments over the production of services.  Table 1 shows 
that measures of fiscal health correlate with municipal size.  The smallest governments are less 
likely to describe a revenue shortfall requiring a reduction in services, while larger municipalities 
are more likely to give a pessimistic view of the next five years.  Ten percent of the largest 
municipalities anticipate service reductions.
6  Smaller municipalities might feel less pressure to 
use external contracts to address short-term fiscal stress; when asked about future plans for 
privatization, the smallest local governments are least likely to consider expanding privatization. 
[Table 1 here] 
  When municipalities do use private contractors, the process and outcomes differ 
significantly.  The smallest municipalities are least likely to report comparing costs between 
public and private production methods, using a competitive bidding process, or generating a 9 
 
sufficient number of bids from private contractors.  Perhaps due to these reasons, respondents 
from smaller municipalities are also least likely to report that privatization produces cost savings.  
Write-in responses suggest that smaller, rural local governments appear to use privatization as a 
matter of practicality.  Respondents described scenarios like hiring out tasks to avoid investments 
in equipment or the need to hire more than a portion of a specialist’s time.  
Patterns in the Production of Services.  In table 2 we detail the patterns of how municipalities in 
our sample actually produce services.  Because decisions over the form of service provision may 
relate to the degree that a service involves client contact, italics denote services where citizens 
might be particularly likely to interact with service providers.  Local officials may view services 
that are more ―out of sight out of mind‖ more suitable to contracting out.  
[Table 2 here] 
This descriptive information reveals a number of patterns.  First, both privatization and 
cooperative agreements are quite common.  For about half of the 59 services, one of these two 
forms of production is used by more than 20 percent of municipalities.  Over 80 percent of 
surveyed municipalities rely on another government for production of at least one service, with 
programs for the elderly, delinquent tax collection, title record/plot map maintenance, animal 
shelter operation and tax billing processing most frequently provided through inter-governmental 
cooperation.  Services provided by contract, either by a private contractor or another 
government, include nearly all the services likely to involve client contact.   
These results also raise the question of whether cooperative agreements should be viewed 
as an alternative to privatization.  While the descriptive results do not allow a formal test of this 
relationship, they indicate that many services frequently provided through cooperative 
agreements are also among the least frequently contracted to for-profit contractors.  Ranking 10 
 
services according to the proportion of municipalities employing a particular method of 
provision and deriving a rank correlation produces a Spearman correlation coefficient of –0.26, 
significant at the 5 percent level.  Services that are among the most frequently provided by 
private, for-profit contractors tend to be closer to the bottom of the list of services ranked 
according to the frequency that they are contracted to another government.   
Responsibilities like management and training of first-responders (e.g. fire, police, 
emergency medical services) are frequently shared with other governments, but almost never 
delegated to private for-profit entities.  It may be the case that in emergency situations first-
responders are the ―face of local government‖ and local officials want to retain tighter control 
over these services.   In the last section of table 2 we identify services where privatization and 
contracting with other governments are both used significantly.  For these 11 services, including 
tax assessing, insect/rodent control, and traffic signal maintenance, it is likely that many 
municipalities face a menu of provision options. 
  Results in table 3 give further insight into conditions under which a municipality is likely 
to enlist a private contractor or another governmental entity for production of a particular 
service.  The analysis identifies the proportion of municipalities (by size) using a particular 
method of service production for a subset of approximately 30 services frequently produced 
either by private contractors or another government or municipality.
7  Results indicate smaller 
municipalities are much more likely to use contracts with other governments, relative to their 
larger counterparts.  For 26 of 33 services, the smallest municipalities use contracts with other 
governments more frequently than the largest.  Privatization does not have a clear population 
trend: relationship between municipality size and proportion of governments relying on for-profit 11 
 
contractors appears to vary by the type of service.  For 14 of the 33 services identified in table 3, 
larger municipalities use private contractors more frequently than their smaller counterparts. 
[Table 3 here] 
Satisfaction with Contracted Services.  The survey asked respondents to indicate satisfaction 
with services, using a five point Likert scale, where responses range from ―very satisfied‖ to ―not 
satisfied.‖  In table 4 we report mean satisfaction levels, by form of service provision for each of 
the services shown in table 3.  Nearly all response means are close to 3, indicating that 
respondents consider themselves ―satisfied‖ with the services provided, regardless of the form of 
production.  Production by the municipality’s own employees generally associates with the 
highest level of satisfaction.  This may indicate that the various forms of contracting involve a 
tradeoff in terms of service quality and suggests that a desire for improved service quality is not 
a key motivation for privatization or intergovernmental cooperation.   
[Table 4 here] 
It is worth noting that the results may also simply reflect the bias of respondents, who 
may directly supervise production of services.  Although respondents may favor their own 
employees, they are less likely to have systematic biases in relative satisfaction with other forms 
of service production.  In particular, comparing satisfaction between services produced by other 
governments and those produced by private contractors offers some indication of whether the 
profit-motive of private contractors creates some systematic tradeoff in terms of quality.  Based 
on raw data, satisfaction levels associated with services produced by other governments are 
roughly comparable to satisfaction levels with services produced by private contractors. 
Multivariate Analysis Results 12 
 
Multivariate analyses identify municipal characteristics that correlate to: (1) a municipality’s 
current choices of service provision; (2) its plans to increase privatization; and (3) the 
relationship between choice of production method and reported satisfaction by local government 
officials.  Regardless of the dependent variable, all estimations use as explanatory variables five 
sets of factors that we hypothesize will correlate to decisions over contracting: measures of scale, 
indicators of rural communities, measures of stress, a focus on efficiency, and a measure of local 
ideology.  In addition, estimations include a vector of dummy variables capturing state-specific 
effects and, when appropriate, a full set of 58 service-specific indicator variables.  Our dependent 
variables (decision to contract out, the likelihood to contract out in the future, and level of 
satisfaction) are discrete.  Here traditional regression analysis is inappropriate and we use both 
logit and ordered probit estimators as necessary.  Where our dependent variables vary by both 
service and municipality, we have about 36,000 observations and cluster standard errors. 
Explanatory Variables. Measures of scale, which proxy for the constraints faced by the smallest 
municipalities, include population, population squared, and median income.  The smallest or 
most impoverished municipalities, which cannot efficiently produce a full range of services, 
might have the most to gain from employing external contracts.  These municipalities also face 
some of the largest obstacles towards using contracts effectively.  Decisions might be made by 
elected officials rather than professional managers, who have specific training and may be better 
attuned to quality.  We use Census Bureau’s estimated population for the survey year (1995, 
1997, and 2004).  The 2000 census provides the source for the median income and population 
density measures.  Even after controlling for scale, rural communities might be different from 
their urban counterparts.  Geographic dispersion may make it harder for these communities to 
attract a sufficient number of bids from private contractors, or even to forge close contracts with 13 
 
neighboring communities.  We include two variables, population density, and a dummy variable 
that identifies municipalities that are close to an urban area. 
  Decisions to contract may be a response to fiscal stress or difficulty in providing services 
to growing populations.  Two variables capture stress: an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one if the municipality reports ―inadequate‖ revenues, and a measure of population growth (in 
percentage terms) derived from comparing the 1990 and 2000 Census population measures.  An 
additional set of variables intends to capture the degree that municipal officials focus on 
efficiency.  If municipalities routinely compare costs and use competitive bidding processes, this 
may indicate that these municipalities have implemented systems to control costs.  Regressions 
also include the percentage of Republican voters in the previous gubernatorial election as an 
indication of local ideology.  Only NH provides these data at a municipal level and we use 
county-level returns for WI and IL.
8  Voting patterns, which correlate to privatization decisions 
in López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) county-level analysis, may reflect ideological 
predisposition towards private markets and against government provision. 
  The final independent variables are fixed-effects indicator variables for services and 
geographic regions.  Service indicator variables, one for each of the 59 services, control for 
otherwise unobserved characteristics of the individual services (like the degree of client contact).  
We also experiment with replacing these 59 variables with a single indicator for services where 
citizens interact directly with providers.  The geographic indicators identify the three states.  We 
separately identify small municipalities within Cook County (which contains the City of 
Chicago) from the remainder of IL.  It is important to note that the New Hampshire survey was 
completed much later than the others and there has been a significant increase in the degree of 
reliance on contracting in the past decade.  The geography variables control for both state and 14 
 
year, but the data do not allow us to distinguish the effect of geography from the effect of time.  
These geographic indicators also control for structural difference across states like laws, 
financing arrangements, and the presence of functioning county government, among others.   
Relationship between Municipality Characteristics and Service Production: Pooled Model.  
Our first set of estimations considers the relationship between characteristics of a municipality 
and the choice of a particular form of service production (table 5).  Coefficient signs are 
consistent across specifications.  The correlation between municipal attributes and the tendency 
to contract out services does not particularly depend upon how the form of contracting is defined.  
The types of municipalities that enter into contracts with private contractors also enter into 
agreements with other governments.  Population correlates negatively with contracting decisions.  
The smallest municipalities do appear to have the most to benefit from scale, scope and 
flexibility offered by external contracts, a finding consistent with Kodrzycki (1994, 32) that 
patterns in privatization are largely ―bottom up.‖  Our results indicate that this conclusion 
extends to even the smallest municipalities, though the relationship appears to be nonlinear.  
Median income correlates positively to all forms of contracting.   
[Table 5 here] 
Although the coefficient of population density is always statistically insignificant, the 
indicator for municipalities within a Metropolitan Statistical Area supports the conclusion that 
rural municipalities provide fewer services using outside contracts.  Furthermore, the combined 
effect of population and MSA in these estimations indicate that outside contracts may be 
particularly attractive option for smaller cities in (or on the fringes of) metropolitan areas.  Such 
municipalities are small enough to benefit from the scale economies that outside contracts offer.  15 
 
At the same time, they have access to a large number of potential collaborators, both other 
governments and a significant pool of private contractors. 
Fiscal stress, population growth, or current fiscal management practices are not strongly 
correlated to contracting decisions.  Coefficients on fiscal stress, population growth, and use of 
competitive bidding processes all have insignificant (5 percent level) associations with use of 
contracts.  Municipalities that compare costs between public and private production, however, 
are less likely to use private contractors.  While contrary to our hypothesis, this finding is 
consistent with earlier observation that respondents appear to use privatization as a matter of 
practicality, rather than as a general cost-saving strategy.  Our measure of ideology reinforces the 
conclusion that contracting decisions, particularly those with for-profit contractors are driven by 
more than a focus on efficiency.  Ideology matters; it is positively associated with the use of for-
profit contractors as well as contracting, broadly defined.  Kodrzycki (1994) finds lower rates of 
privatization in New England, which are not replicated in our results.  The omitted state, NH, 
shows a propensity to use private, for profit contractors more commonly than WI or most of IL.
9 
Municipalities might be more reluctant to cede provision responsibility for services 
involving direct contact with citizens; we re-estimate the three models using a single indicator 
variable for ―high-contact‖ services identified in italics in table 2.  Signs and significance levels 
for coefficients on other explanatory variables (population, income, stress, etc.) are unchanged in 
this specification (not shown).  The coefficient on the variable measuring high contact, shown 
separately at the bottom of the table, is positive and strongly significant.  Municipalities in this 
sample are more likely to contract out services involving direct contact with clients. 
While we cannot formally test if some underlying set of characteristics determine both 
privatization and contracts with other governments, the data appear consistent with this 16 
 
hypothesis.  Types of services contracted with other governments typically differ from the types 
of services privatized, arguing that they are not direct substitutes.  At the same time, municipal 
features that correlate to privatization decisions correlate similarly with the decision to engage in 
contracts with other governments. 
Relationship between Municipal Characteristics and Plans for Future Privatization:  
Cross-Sectional Model.  An important limitation of cross-sectional results like those reported in 
table 5 is the potential for endogeneity.  All variation in the model comes from differences 
between municipalities; we do not observe the decision within a municipality to change 
provision of any particular service.  Results from such cross-sectional estimation can be biased if 
explanatory variables are causally linked to past production decisions.  Current fiscal stress and 
administrative practices like comparing costs or using competitive bids may associate with prior 
procurement and production decisions.  This limitation cannot be fully mitigated without long-
duration panel data.  For this reason, results from the pooled cross-sectional model should be 
viewed as indications of correlation, rather than evidence of causality. 
  Data used here offer a dependent variable less likely to raise issues of endogeneity, thus 
allowing stronger causal inferences.  Survey respondents are not only asked about current 
practices, but also about future plans.  The second set of empirical models estimate focus on if 
the municipality plans to increase privatization in the future.  Here, we measure fiscal stress both 
in terms of current and expected future stress controlling for prior privatization experiences.  We 
first use expected stress, based on the hypothesis that future plans are based on expected future 
conditions.  In a separate estimation we include current stress, to allow for the possibility that 
plans for future privatization are a reaction to current conditions.  To control for a municipality’s 
existing experiences, we add an index variable based on number of services privatized.  While 17 
 
using plans to increase privatization as a dependent variable has the benefit of reducing the 
likelihood of bias, the model also has limitations.  We now focus exclusively on privatization, 
instead of the full menu of production options.  In addition, the dependent variable elicits 
information about general privatization plans rather than information about specific services.  
The results for this analysis are provided in the first two columns of table 6. 
[Table 6 here] 
  The population coefficient estimate is positive and significant, while the squared 
population term has a negative and significant coefficient.  This concave relationship may reflect 
more sophisticated planning processes of larger municipalities.  High-growth areas are more 
likely to plan increases in privatization.  Indicators for rural counties, self-reported fiscal stress, 
sensitivity to costs, and ideology all have statistically insignificant relationships with plans to 
increase privatization.  It may be that either the question about increasing privatization or the 
explanatory variables are too general to identify specific patterns in privatization decisions.  The 
weak relationship between plans to contract and measures of fiscal stress is particularly 
surprising.  Perhaps local governments see themselves as needed to provide jobs and therefore 
choose not to enter into new contracts at times when a private sector contraction is taking place.  
It is also possible that the results are consistent with a long-run equilibrium.  Municipalities have 
already chosen their optimal bundle of production choices based on observable characteristics of 
municipalities, and plans for future changes represent largely idiosyncratic variations to specific 
and otherwise unobservable changes at the local government level. 
Relationship between Forms of Service Provision and Satisfaction.  While the results presented 
in table 5 and the left columns of table 6 identify factors associated with different forms of 
service production, they provide no indication of perceived quality.  To gain insight into this 18 
 
question, we estimate an ordered probit model to identify the relationship between municipal 
characteristics and satisfaction, controlling for the service and form of service provision.  Table 
6, column 3, reports results using the full set of indicator variables.  The last column uses a 
single indicator to capture the effect of services with a great deal of client contact. 
  The majority of control variables have statistically insignificant relationships with 
satisfaction.  The measure of fiscal stress and the indicator for services involving client contact 
both have negative and significant coefficients.  The variables of most interest are the last four, 
which measure satisfaction with form of service production relative to ―private, for profit,‖ the 
omitted group.  As suggested by analysis presented in table 4, satisfaction with ―your employees 
entirely‖ is higher than satisfaction with any other form of service production.  Furthermore, the 
difference between ―private for profit‖ and ―other government or authority‖ is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  This result suggests that, in a comparison that avoids the bias 
respondents have for their own employees, private contractors offer comparable or better quality 
service relative to their public counterparts.  
Conclusions 
Despite extensive literature examining options in the delivery of public services, few 
studies focus on smaller and rural municipalities.  This research addresses this shortcoming.  
Using survey data from three states, we document that even the smallest municipalities use a 
range of provision methods, including contracting with for-profit private firms, non-profit 
organizations, and other governments.  Even in a sample of communities with population less 
than 10,000, contracting in all its forms is a ―bottom-up‖ phenomenon negatively associated with 
population.  Nonetheless, small municipalities face significant constraints, especially insufficient 
bids.  This is notable because a necessary condition for outsourcing to be effective is sufficient 19 
 
number of entities competing for the contract.  When such a critical mass of competing entities is 
not present, outsourcing may be an unrealistic or a less preferred option.  When facing very few 
bids, the ultimate check on monopoly pricing is the ability of a local government to deliver the 
service itself.  It is perhaps not surprising then, that smaller municipalities are less likely to report 
cost savings associated with private contracts. 
  Since survey data do not directly suggest how small, rural local governments overcome 
the challenges of administering public-private contracts, we cannot directly test the hypothesis 
that transactions costs are too high for small and rural municipal officials and administrators to 
effectively write, monitor and enforce service contracts.  We can observe that while 
municipalities frequently work together to produce services, they do not seem to cooperate in 
development and management of outside contracts.  When NH survey respondents were asked if 
bordering municipalities had privatized services, a majority answered ―don’t know.‖  Only three 
of 138 surveyed NH municipalities indicated that decisions of their neighbors had an effect on 
their own decision to privatize services.  Of those, one cited learning from another municipality’s 
experience and two referred to combining their needs to collectively bid out a contract. 
  Small municipalities might benefit by expanding from collaboration in production of 
services to collaboration in managing external contracts, if only by sharing information with 
other municipalities.  More sophisticated collaboration would involve multi-community contracts 
for service production; these might justify the expense of setting up competitive bidding 
processes to generate sufficient numbers of bids, and allow communities to consolidate oversight 
expenses and other costs.  In IL and WI smaller municipalities may join together and approach 
the county for help in writing requests for bids, soliciting, monitoring and enforcing contracts.   20 
 
The potential for greater use of ad hoc collaborative arrangements may be a salient issue 
for the smallest municipalities.  It seems unlikely that benefits of collaborative agreements have 
been fully exploited regionally.  The fact that local government officials are not influenced by, or 
even aware of the actions of neighboring municipalities, is an indicator of this.  Lackey, 
Freshwater and Rupasingha (2002, 149) find that ―isolation can be a major impediment to local 
government cooperation.‖  Structural or legal barriers, and traditional protection of powers can 
contribute to this isolation.  Meanwhile, many municipalities report significant fiscal stress.  
Therefore, collaboration is generating increased attention as a cost-saving, efficiency enhancing 
option, especially if there are too few private suppliers to provide true competition.  Here small 
neighboring municipalities could agree to support each other as is commonly done with 
protective services where municipal employees work together to produce services to jointly 
contracting with private for profit firms or non-profit agencies.  The use of policy and planning 
networks can facilitate this (Leroux and Clark 2007; Thurmaier and Wood 2002). 
In spite of the constraints and limits of collaboration, small communities seem to manage 
well.  The smallest communities are least likely to report severe fiscal stress or to expect to 
reduce future services.  Although contracting decisions may not always be part of an overall 
cost-savings strategy, these municipalities effectively use contracts to produce specific and 
specialized services they cannot produce themselves.  While reported satisfaction associates 
slightly negatively to population, respondents in small and rural municipalities generally indicate 
that they are ―satisfied‖ with services received.  Estimation results suggest that satisfaction with 
private contractors exceeds satisfaction reported with services produced by other governments.  
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Table 1 – Survey Responses by Municipality Size 








>5000)  IL  WI  NH 
Total (un-
weighted) 
Rate the current fiscal condition of your municipality               
Adequate revenue and able to reduce taxes  13%  17%  19%  12%  21%  15%  16% 
Adequate revenue, but not able to expand services  63%  57%  56%  61%  59%  52%  59% 
Inadequate revenue, but not reducing services  21%  22%  19%  22%  19%  22%  21% 
Inadequate revenue, reducing services  3%  4%  5%  4%  2%  10%  4% 
                What are the financial prospects of your municipality over the 
next five years 
             
Adequate revenue and able to reduce taxes  10%  16%  14%  11%  16%  15%  14% 
Adequate revenue, but not able to expand services  63%  55%  55%  59%  60%  50%  58% 
Inadequate revenue, but not reducing services  20%  19%  21%  22%  19%  19%  20% 
Inadequate revenue,  reducing services somewhat  6%  9%  10%  8%  5%  16%  8% 
                In the next five years, will your town:               
Increase privatization  3%  12%  37%  18%  13%  11%  15% 
Remain the same  61%  52%  34%  52%  48%  55%  51% 
Decrease privatization  1%  2%  0%  1%  0%  2%  1% 
Don’t Know  35%  35%  29%  29%  39%  31%  33% 
                Has privatization or contracting resulted in cost savings?               
Yes, in all instances  12%  15%  19%  17%  15%  7%  15% 
Yes, in some instances  55%  62%  72%  56%  69%  63%  62% 
No  34%  23%  9%  27%  17%  30%  23% 
                Does your municipality compare costs between services 
provided by a public agency and a private entity (fraction 
“yes”) 
68%  72%  81%  68%  80%  69%  73% 
                Are municipal contracts with private firms bid competitively? 
(fraction “yes”) 
87%  88%  94%  89%  91%  84%  89% 
                Have a sufficient number of private contractors bid on most 
municipal services? (fraction “yes”) 
75%  77%  81%  78%  81%  63%  77% 
                Does your municipality provide services for other governments 
by contract? (fraction “yes”) 
12%  21%  49%  23%  27%  25%  25% 
                Number of respondents  414  392  277  505  441  137     24 
Table 2 – Distribution of Service provision (all three states)       
Services typically provided 




















Building security  498  78.5%  10.0%  3.6%  7.6%  0.2% 
Building/grounds maintenance  880  72.8%  20.0%  0.3%  6.5%  0.3% 
Payroll administration  940  92.0%  4.2%  0.9%  3.0%  0.0% 
Personnel services  645  90.9%  6.7%  0.8%  1.7%  0.0% 
Public relations/information  544  79.4%  16.2%  2.2%  1.7%  0.6% 
Secretarial services  748  92.7%  5.4%  0.9%  1.1%  0.0% 
Snowplowing sanding  1029  77.1%  11.0%  4.1%  7.4%  0.5% 
Street repair/maintenance  1017  45.8%  40.5%  3.4%  9.9%  0.2% 
Traffic control/parking 
enforcement  724  83.7%  6.63%  8.7%  1.0%  0.00% 
Water distribution  860  83.1%  7.44%  4.5%  4.2%  0.70% 
             
Services frequently privatized             
Vehicles, not emergency or 
heavy equipment  596  58.7%  28.7%  1.7%  10.7%  0.2% 
Bill collection  617  69.4%  15.9%  1.8%  12.8%  0.2% 
Building security  474  62.7%  13.7%  8.4%  15.0%  0.2% 
Commercial solid waste 
collection  765  7.2%  4.1%  2.4%  85.8%  0.7% 
Fleet management/vehicle 
maint  708  52.4%  35.0%  0.6%  11.4%  0.6% 
Heavy equipment  592  55.6%  27.2%  1.7%  15.2%  0.3% 
Inspection/code enforcement  717  70.3%  13.5%  4.0%  11.7%  0.4% 
Labor relations  546  59.2%  23.3%  2.6%  14.8%  0.2% 
Legal services  848  12.1%  7.0%  4.2%  75.6%  1.1% 
Recycling  862  12.3%  9.0%  8.6%  66.7%  3.4% 
Residential solid waste 
collection  919  15.3%  2.2%  2.7%  79.2%  0.5% 
Street light operation  842  19.2%  10.3%  8.0%  60.2%  2.3% 
Street parking lot cleaning  736  73.1%  12.2%  2.3%  11.7%  0.7% 
Street sweeping  828  71.4%  5.0%  5.1%  18.0%  0.6% 
Tree trimming/planting  832  34.0%  40.3%  1.6%  22.8%  1.3% 
Utility billing  886  76.7%  6.2%  2.8%  14.0%  0.2% 
Utility meter reading  847  73.7%  5.8%  3.7%  16.5%  0.4% 
Vehicle towing and storage  613  10.8%  5.7%  7.2%  75.7%  0.7% 
Yard waste collection  697  38.0%  19.7%  2.0%  39.2%  1.1% 
Note: italics denote services likely to involve direct contact between service providers and citizens 
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Services frequently provided 
through cooperative 
agreements             
Animal control  786  43.8%  17.9%  28.5%  6.4%  3.3% 
Crime prevention/patrol  909  73.5%  12.2%  13.6%  0.4%  0.2% 
Data processing  627  72.2%  14.0%  10.5%  3.2%  0.0% 
Delinquent tax collection  749  31.6%  9.5%  57.4%  0.8%  0.7% 
Fire communication  772  36.3%  10.6%  47.2%  0.9%  5.1% 
Fire prevention/suppression  767  51.4%  9.8%  32.9%  0.5%  5.5% 
Fire training  749  26.2%  25.6%  39.8%  2.3%  6.0% 
Operation and maintenance 
of recreation facilities  810  70.7%  12.3%  13.2%  1.5%  2.2% 
Operation of libraries  655  52.2%  6.3%  37.9%  0.5%  3.2% 
Parks landscaping/maint.  856  69.3%  13.2%  11.0%  5.5%  1.1% 
Police communication  813  41.3%  15.9%  39.9%  1.5%  1.5% 
Police training  766  28.6%  27.8%  37.9%  3.5%  2.2% 
Programs for the elderly  436  7.8%  13.1%  62.8%  3.4%  12.8% 
Recreation services  741  61.3%  17.7%  15.9%  1.1%  4.0% 
Sanitation inspection  529  34.6%  14.7%  46.9%  3.0%  0.8% 
Sewage collection  806  78.7%  6.5%  10.5%  4.0%  0.4% 
Sewage treatment  781  71.6%  5.5%  17.5%  4.9%  0.5% 
Tax billing processing  787  37.9%  11.3%  48.4%  1.9%  0.5% 
Water treatment  808  75.6%  5.8%  12.3%  5.4%  0.9% 
             
Services with a broad mix of 
provision options             
Ambulance service  844  29.5%  3.8%  35.6%  19.2%  11.97% 
Animal shelter operation  556  9.7%  5.2%  50.5%  18.2%  16.4% 
Cemetery admin/maint  510  49.2%  9.0%  13.5%  12.2%  16.1% 
Emergency medical service  821  33.4%  8.2%  37.5%  10.2%  10.7% 
Emergency vehicles  625  44.2%  25.4%  15.2%  12.6%  2.6% 
Insect/rodent control  457  25.8%  13.8%  27.6%  31.9%  0.9% 
Sludge disposal  596  43.5%  9.40%  20.1%  25.2%  1.85% 
Solid waste disposal  838  10.1%  5.1%  10.5%  72.8%  1.4% 
Tax assessing  805  22.6%  7.5%  34.4%  35.2%  0.4% 
Title record/plot map maint  646  15.9%  13.6%  55.4%  14.2%  0.8% 
Traffic signal install/maint  576  32.1%  20.1%  25.3%  22.0%  0.3% 
Note: italics denote services likely to involve direct contact between service providers and citizens. 
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Table 3 – Rates of privatization or Cooperative Arrangement, by town size for select services 
(conditional on providing service) 
  Another Government or 
Authority 
Private, for profit 




















             
Ambulance service  51.9%  36.1%  15.6%  21.4%  16.8%  19.8% 
Animal control  40.2%  24.1%  22.1%  7.8%  3.5%  8.7% 
Animal shelter operation  67.6%  51.8%  37.1%  15.1%  15.5%  23.4% 
Cemetery admin/maint  17.3%  13.3%  9.6%  12.0%  11.1%  14.1% 
Commercial solid waste collection  4.1%  2.2%  0.5%  81.0%  86.7%  90.4% 
Delinquent tax collection  65.3%  51.5%  56.2%  0.0%  0.7%  2.0% 
Emergency medical service  55.9%  38.0%  17.9%  10.3%  8.1%  12.7% 
Emergency vehicles  30.0%  15.9%  4.4%  10.2%  16.8%  10.0% 
Fire communication  60.6%  55.0%  26.3%  1.8%  1.0%  0.0% 
Fire prevention/suppression  49.8%  36.9%  13.3%  1.3%  0.3%  0.0% 
Fire training  48.8%  43.2%  26.5%  2.5%  2.2%  2.1% 
Legal services  6.1%  4.0%  2.4%  81.9%  79.1%  63.7% 
Operation of libraries  47.6%  31.9%  39.1%  0.7%  0.3%  0.5% 
Police communication  56.6%  43.3%  22.0%  3.2%  1.2%  0.4% 
Police training  59.1%  33.8%  26.9%  3.6%  2.2%  5.1% 
Recycling  13.6%  7.6%  4.6%  59.3%  66.8%  74.3% 
Residential solid waste collection  4.7%  2.5%  0.4%  77.4%  81.8%  78.2% 
Sanitation inspection  60.5%  44.2%  40.8%  4.7%  3.5%  1.5% 
Sewage Treatment  9.5%  14.7%  30.1%  2.0%  5.0%  7.9% 
Sludge disposal  11.6%  15.8%  31.8%  29.0%  24.2%  23.4% 
Solid waste disposal  12.1%  8.2%  11.7%  69.9%  74.0%  74.5% 
Street light operation  8.3%  9.8%  5.3%  78.8%  54.1%  44.7% 
Street repair/maintenance  6.9%  1.9%  0.7%  18.3%  5.4%  4.5% 
Street sweeping  11.7%  3.3%  1.5%  25.2%  16.0%  14.3% 
Tax assessing  30.4%  28.8%  47.7%  41.7%  42.5%  16.2% 
Tax billing processing  45.8%  45.1%  56.2%  2.8%  1.6%  1.4% 
Title record/plot map maintenance  63.9%  53.9%  49.2%  15.2%  17.4%  9.1% 
Traffic signal installation/maintenance  16.9%  27.8%  27.3%  12.7%  13.9%  33.3% 
Tree trimming/planting  2.3%  1.6%  0.8%  30.8%  18.3%  20.2% 
Utility billing  2.2%  2.5%  4.0%  19.7%  11.7%  9.5% 
Utility meter reading  2.7%  3.6%  4.9%  21.9%  14.1%  13.0% 
Vehicle towing and storage  18.2%  5.2%  2.5%  65.7%  73.3%  84.0% 
Yard waste collection  3.2%  1.9%  1.2%  33.9%  32.4%  50.4% 
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Table 4 – Satisfaction levels with select services 














Ambulance service  4.5  3.8  4.2  4.0  4.4 
Animal control  3.9  3.6  3.4  3.7   
Animal shelter operation  3.7    3.6  3.8  3.9 
Cemetery admin/maint  3.2  2.8  2.9  2.9  3.1 
Commercial solid waste collection  4.4  3.8    4.0   
Delinquent tax collection  4.3  3.9  3.9     
Emergency medical service  4.5  4.1  4.1  4.0  4.3 
Emergency vehicles  3.4  2.9  3.1  2.9   
Fire communication  4.3  4.1  4.1    4.3 
Fire prevention/suppression  4.4  4.1  4.1    4.4 
Fire training  4.4  4.2  4.1    4.2 
Legal services  4.2  4.0  4.4  4.1   
Operation of libraries  4.3  4.2  4.2     
Police communication  4.3  4.0  3.9     
Police training  4.2  4.2  4.1     
Recycling  4.2  4.0  4.1  4.1   
Residential solid waste collection  4.4      4.1   
Sanitation inspection  4.2  3.7  3.6     
Sludge disposal  4.3  4.2  3.9  4.0   
Solid waste disposal  4.3  3.9  3.8  4.1   
Street light operation  4.4  4.0  4.1  4.1   
Street repair/maintenance  4.1  3.9  4.2  4.1   
Street sweeping  4.2  3.6  3.8  3.8   
Tax assessing  4.5  4.0  3.5  4.1   
Tax billing processing  4.5  4.3  3.9     
Title record/plot map maintenance  4.2  3.7  3.9  3.9   
Traffic signal 
installation/maintenance 
4.3  4.0  3.9  3.9   
Tree trimming/planting  4.1  3.9    4.0   
Utility billing  4.4  4.0    4.1   
Utility meter reading  4.3  3.9  3.8  4.1   
Vehicle towing and storage  4.2  3.6  3.8  3.9   
Yard waste collection  4.3  3.8    3.9   
Notes: Satisfaction measured according to a 5 point Likert scale.  Mean satisfaction levels suppressed if 
fewer than 30 respondents reported using the provision method.   28 











Population (thousands)  -0.034***  -0.081***  -0.049*** 
  (3.34)  (7.12)  (5.08) 
Population squared  0.0003  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (1.23)  (5.12)  (3.15) 
Median Household inc  0.005**  0.007***  0.009*** 
  (2.19)  (3.59)  (4.51) 
Population density  0.019  -0.005  -0.025 
  (0.54)  (0.15)  (1.00) 
MSA dummy  0.176**  0.099  0.134* 
  (2.24)  (1.15)  (1.91) 
Current stress  -0.031  -0.103  0.008 
  (0.45)  (1.37)  (0.13) 
Population growth  0.001  0.002*  0.001 
  (0.97)  (1.95)  (1.08) 
Compares costs  -0.149**  0.042  0.004 
  (2.25)  (0.56)  (0.07) 
Competitive bids  0.007  -0.120  -0.085 
  (0.07)  (0.95)  (0.97) 
% Repub  0.019***  -0.001  0.010** 
  (4.02)  (0.27)  (2.28) 
IL – Cook County  -0.208  1.632***  0.601*** 
  (1.00)  (6.68)  (3.21) 
IL – Other  -0.538***  1.715***  0.469*** 
  (3.15)  (8.76)  (3.29) 
WI  -0.653***  0.840***  -0.141 
  (4.32)  (4.82)  (1.11) 
High-contact service  0.381***  0.583***  0.481*** 
  (14.94)  (19.80)  (19.44) 
Logit Coefficients.  N=36,605.  Each estimation at top of table includes 59 control 
variables for individual services.  Coefficients for ―high-contact service‖ come from 
separate estimations that use a single indicator for services involving citizen contact.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (clustered standard errors). * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   29 
Table 6: Plans to Increase Privatization (Logit); Satisfaction with Provision (Ordered Probit) 








Population (thousands)  0.227***  0.227***  -0.014  -0.014 
  (6.76)  (6.82)  (1.41)  (1.46) 
Population squared  -0.004***  -0.004***  0.0005*  0.0004* 
  (5.11)  (5.15)  (1.78)  (1.82) 
Median household income  -0.004  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.61)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.56) 
Population density  0.045  0.040  -0.007  -0.008 
  (0.46)  (0.41)  (0.19)  (0.23) 
MSA dummy  0.138  0.129  0.037  0.033 
  (0.53)  (0.49)  (0.56)  (0.50) 
Future fiscal stress  0.054       
  (0.23)       
Current fiscal stress    0.106  -0.287***  -0.287*** 
    (0.44)  (4.65)  (4.68) 
Population growth  0.006**  0.006*  0.001  0.001 
  (1.96)  (1.86)  (1.12)  (1.07) 
Compares costs  0.477*  0.399  0.012  0.010 
  (1.78)  (1.51)  (0.18)  (0.15) 
Competitive bids  -0.540  -0.565*  0.124  0.120 
  (1.64)  (1.73)  (1.41)  (1.38) 
% Republican  0.003  0.005  0.003  0.003 
  (0.22)  (0.31)  (0.67)  (0.66) 
Number of services privatized  0.031  0.027     
  (1.19)  (1.05)     
IL – Cook County  0.630  0.623  -0.236  -0.238 
  (1.01)  (1.00)  (1.24)  (1.27) 
IL – Other  0.568  0.573  -0.232*  -0.240* 
  (1.03)  (1.05)  (1.65)  (1.73) 
WI  0.750  0.720  -0.041  -0.043 
  (1.49)  (1.44)  (0.32)  (0.34) 
High-contact service        -0.062*** 
        (4.95) 
―Your employees entirely‖      0.404***  0.361*** 
      (11.02)  (12.14) 
―Your employees in part‖      -0.025  -0.082** 
      (0.65)  (2.43) 
―Another govt or authority‖      -0.112***  -0.110*** 
      (2.66)  (3.14) 
―Private, not for profit‖      0.094  0.117* 
      (1.34)  (1.74) 
Observations  862  878  31,310  31,310 
 
Column 3 includes full set of 59 control variables for individual services; column 4 includes 
indicator for services involving citizen contact.  Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
(clustered standard errors for ordered probits). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Notes 
1. Here we refer to a cooperative agreement as any arrangement for another government or authority to 
provide a service.  Such an arrangement may, but does not have to, be in the form of a partnership with an 
even two-sided cooperative process and joint resource contributions. 
 
2. Versions of this hypothesis include Niskanen’s Law, Tullock’s Law, and Baumol’s Law.  Niskanen’s 
Law maintains that government bureaucrats maximize their own personal objectives of increasing 
authority, controlling more personnel, and administering larger budgets.  These objectives necessitate 
larger and inefficient government (Niskanen 1971; Casas-Pardo and Puchades-Navarro 2001).  Tullock’s 
Law maintains that the lack of competitive market forces and the power of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand 
introduce bureaucratic waste into the public arena (Boettke 2008). Baumol’s Law argues that, since the 
public sector lacks profit motivations, there is little incentive for government to innovate in the name of 
increasing efficiencies (Fase and Winder 1999).   
 
3. The possibilities for such collaboration are much broader, however, and only a few authors (Lackey, 
Freshwater, and Rupasingha 2002; Agranoff and McGuire 2004) provide in-depth discussions of 
collaboration.  Furthermore, Warner and Hefetz (2002) point out that the literature generally does not 
jointly consider cooperation and privatization as differing options for service production.   
 
4. Jang (2006) discusses this and other potential sources of selection bias, and then uses a Heckman 
Selection model to mitigate the problem. 
 
5. A number of case studies focus on smaller communities.  Particularly relevant are Lackey et al. (2002), 
who study cooperation among counties in Tennessee, and Jossart-Marcelli and Musso (2005), who 
undertake an extensive study of ―make or buy‖ decisions for a set of southern California cities. 
 
6. Because the surveys reflect conditions from different years and the summary statistic is an unweighted 
mean, this result might be driven by changing economic conditions.  The same pattern (smallest towns 
least likely to report inadequate revenues) holds for both WI and NH.  IL does not show notable 
correlation between population and measures of fiscal stress. 
 
7. We select services provided by at least 500 municipalities and where at least 20% of municipalities 
providing a service choose to do so through a contract with either a for-profit firm or another government 
or municipality. 
 
8. A township may include parts of several villages (municipalities).  If a village crosses a township line, 
we use a weighted average based on the number of 2006 polling stations in each township. 
 
9. This finding, in conjunction with Kodrzycki’s result, may mean some New England communities are 
catching up in terms of contracting trends (recall that the NH survey was implemented several years after 
the IL and WI data had been collected).  Differing conclusions might also be driven by differences 
between the larger municipalities observed by Kodrzycki and the smaller municipalities observed here, or 
by differences in the way ―privatization‖ is measured.  We do find support for Kodrzycki’s finding when 
using the broader measure of external contracts, like agreements with other governments or even any 
service that is provided in a way other than the municipality’s ―employees entirely.‖  